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With an impeccable sense of timing, you have given me the opportunity to talk, 
as you say, about something outside the immediate day-to-day concerns of the 
Government over the last few days, and for that, much thanks. 
I would like, if I may, to begin by welcoming the continuing interest of the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies in this issue of budgetary reform and the institutional 
arrangements by which we seek to decide these issues in government, and in 
Parliament. 
The Institute has a long-standing interest in this subject, and it is useful for a 
Minister, and also for one or two other faces I recognise in the audience from 
Parliament and outside, to have a forum in which these important issues can be 
discussed and where the practitioners, the civil servants, the politicians can also 
meet and discuss them with people from the wider interested communities. So I 
am grateful to the Institute for providing such an opportunity. 
Can I begin what I have to say by describing clearly what it is that we are 
seeking to do? What the Chancellor announced in this year’s Budget and 
therefore what is our point of departure. I think I would describe our proposal to 
introduce December Budgets and to align the planning of the revenue and the 
expenditure side of the public sector simply as bringing the public sector into 
line with common sense; as the Chancellor himself said when he announced this 
in the Budget, “to the whole of the rest of the world the word ““budget’’ does 
not just mean the revenue line, it means bringing together in a single document 
or group of documents the revenue and the expenditure and the balance between 
the two’. Whether you are running the public sector as a whole or any smaller 
institution right down to the individual household budget, everybody knows that 
you cannot determine either revenue or expenditure without determining the 
other and looking at the balance between the two. So it has always been obvious 
that these two sides of the Budget are inextricably linked by what I am fond of 
calling the iron laws of arithmetic, and it seems to me, therefore, no more than 
common sense to seek to bring the two together and to make explicit what must 
                                                                                                                                    
* Financial Secretary to the Treasury. Fiscal Studies 
90 
always be there in the background — the clear and direct linkage between the 
two. 
We have, therefore, announced that from December of next year, the 
Chancellor will not present the Budget on the traditional day in early March, but 
will present it, together with the Government’s public expenditure plans, as a 
single set of proposals, to the House of Commons, at the beginning of December. 
The implication of that, clearly, is that having brought forward the 
announcement of the revenue proposals, and, to a small degree, put back the 
announcement of the expenditure proposals, bringing them together in early 
December, the implication is that the Finance Bill then comes forward at an 
earlier date, and, as the White Paper makes clear, we envisage that very early in 
Parliament’s January sitting. We also envisage amending the Provisional 
Collection of Taxes Acts, so that the interim period during which tax can be 
collected, without formal statutory authority of the new rates proposed by the 
Chancellor, runs out at an earlier date, setting effectively the end-date of the 
parliamentary process. 
I have heard just a few moments ago, and I have read comments suggesting 
that the effect of that change in the planning of the Finance Bill procedure, will 
be to limit or to reduce the time available to the House of Commons for 
consideration of the detail of a Finance Bill. 
We have said in the White Paper that we are looking for comments on all the 
aspects of the proposals and specifically we have said we are looking for 
comments on the parliamentary implications of the proposals. I do not think I am 
making any new announcement, or exposing any secret, if I say that we are very 
unlikely, even if we had so sought, to get away with a reduction in the time 
available for parliamentary consideration, and that is certainly not part of our 
objective. We are of course conscious that Finance Bills pass through Parliament 
on a relatively confined timetable and we have no desire to see that further 
reduced. And so, while I have seen one or two suggestions that the practical 
effect of the proposal is to reduce the time available for parliamentary 
consideration, that is not our intention. 
The arguments I have so far seen in support of that assertion I have to say I do 
not find convincing but that is one of the issues which is quite explicitly set out 
in the White Paper about which we are seeking further opinions. Clearly, also, 
the fact that we are changing the timetable does provide an opportunity to re-
examine some of the other aspects of the consideration of both revenue and 
expenditure issues in the House of Commons. While the specifics of the proposal 
in the White Paper are relatively confined, the opportunity is there for 
suggestions to be made and proposals to be made about the improvement of 
parliamentary procedure, and as anyone who knows the House of Commons 
knows very well, proposals for changing House of Commons procedures, 
particularly on something as sensitive as a Finance Bill, are not exclusively a Budgetary Reform
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matter for the Government; they are issues which will have to be agreed through 
what, as a former Whip, I well know is referred to as the ‘usual channels’. 
We need to secure consent within the House of Commons about the way in 
which the Finance Bill is processed, and it is, I can state categorically, not part of 
our intention to reduce the time available for consideration of the Bill as it goes 
through Parliament. 
Can I move on now, from describing precisely what we are seeking to do, to 
go into a little detail into why we are seeking to do it? 
The first and most obvious reason is the one that was mentioned by the 
Chancellor — I talked about it myself in the Second Reading speech on this 
year’s Finance Bill and I think it is clear and obvious; it is in the White Paper; it 
is a clear and obvious reason for seeking to bring together revenue and 
expenditure considerations — and that is that I do believe, by bringing the two 
together, it will tend to enhance the quality of decision-making about these two 
inextricably linked sets of issues. 
The Government has an effect on the economy both when it spends and when 
it taxes, and it does seem to me that it is a legitimate consideration to look at the 
two alternative methods of achieving a specific objective and to look at them at 
the same time and alongside each other, rather than seeking to divorce them in 
what is essentially an artificial way, by several months in terms of the 
announcement dates of the decisions. 
Choices and trade-offs are part of any budgeting process and that is as true of 
public sector budgeting as it is of any other sort of budgeting. So I think these 
lead, firstly, to better decision-making. Secondly, and leading on from that, as 
partly a corollary of that, they also lead to a clearer understanding and 
presentation of the issues which lie behind budget choices and proposals. Most 
obviously, they reinforce the inevitable and necessary link between total levels 
of expenditure and total levels of revenue-raising. It underlines and strengthens 
the obvious proposition that, if you are determined, as we are, to limit marginal 
rates of tax, you can only deliver that if you address difficult issues on the 
expenditure side of the budget. These are inextricably linked and are more likely 
to lead both to good-quality decisions and to informed debate about those 
decisions, if the clear and iron linkage between the two is exposed and public, 
and the debate is carried on not about one and the other in isolation, but is 
carried on about the two as a single process. 
We secure, I believe, out of this unified budget, better decision-making, 
clearer presentation, better understanding and an informed debate about the 
issues that lie behind the budgeting process. Fourthly, we also secure benefits to 
taxpayers. The most obvious benefit clearly surrounds PAYE and coding where 
we do have a rather absurd double-barrelled approach to coding currently, which 
is the consequence of the fact that budget decisions are announced so close to the 
beginning of the financial year. I think it is also a significant taxpayer benefit 
that the changes that the Chancellor has in mind, to be timed for a particular Fiscal Studies 
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financial year, start on time at the beginning of that tax year and are not 
backdated from some point of administrative and bureaucratic convenience, later 
in the year. 
I will have a bit more to say in a moment about the questions surrounding the 
timing of implementation of specific tax decisions, because while that is a 
relatively straightforward proposition and, I think, a clear benefit in the context 
particularly of direct tax decisions which are linked to a particular financial year, 
some more difficult questions arise especially in the field of indirect tax where 
further consideration will inevitably have to be given to the question of timing of 
the implementation of a particular tax decision. 
I will just comment briefly on another timing aspect of the announcement of a 
unified Budget. The question has been put “Well, why December?’. The answer, 
I think, comes in the tension between the desire of those fixing tax rates and 
making what used to be called the fiscal judgement to be as close as possible to 
the tax year in question, while at the same time those who are responsible for 
public expenditure planning clearly want to allow adequate time for the global 
totals fixed round the Cabinet table to cascade through the system, so that the 
individual manager of a particular public sector budget knows his budget in 
sufficient time to allow him to plan the implications of that budget for the 
particular year in question. 
There is clearly a tension between those who want to have the maximum 
amount of time, so that people can work through the implications of Cabinet 
room decisions about spending levels — that argues for having the longest 
possible gap — and those who want to ensure that the fiscal judgement and the 
tax decisions are made as close as possible and with the most up-to-date 
information possible — and that argues for a shorter period. It does seem to me 
that by coming together at a date in early December, what we are securing is a 
position where the public expenditure manager does have adequate time to plan 
the implications of spending, from his point of view, and basically for a 
government that is not interested and does not believe that it is part of tax policy 
and fiscal judgements to seek to fine-tune demand in the way that was 
fashionable 20 years ago, we are sufficiently close to the tax year in question by 
December to be able to make adequately informed judgements about the fiscal 
balance that we wish to see during the upcoming financial year. 
So much then for the background. What are the practical consequences of 
these changes that we are proposing to make? Well the first, and most obvious, is 
that there is going to be a feast of Budgets in 1993. There are going to be two, 
one in March and one in December, which has the further practical consequence 
for those who are interested in the development of tax policy, that we regard 
those two Budgets in 1993, and in our internal planning are already regarding 
them in this light, as being a single package delivered into sub-packages. We are 
receiving — and whether we sought them or not, we would continue to receive 
— representations about how the fiscal and tax policy should be developed in Budgetary Reform
93 
next year’s Budget. We are quite consciously thinking about what we can do in 
next year’s March Budget and what we can do in a second package in December. 
So those who are thinking for themselves about the representations they would 
like to make to us, about the evolution of tax policy, should, I think, be conscious 
that that is the background against which we are planning next year’s Budgets 
and tailor their suggestions to us accordingly. 
Secondly, I would like to just mention again briefly the subject of timing. I 
said I think it is a clear benefit of the new system that the rates of direct tax, most 
obviously of income tax and personal allowances, will be known well ahead so 
that people can plan their own affairs. That, I think, is a clear and unqualified 
benefit of the new system. There clearly is a problem, potentially, for a 
Chancellor in, for example, announcing that beer and cigarettes are going to go 
up a fortnight before Christmas, and so I do not think we can, in fact, suggest 
that there will be an iron law that determines that all tax proposals of a particular 
kind will come into force on a particular date. Some tax changes, for reasons that 
are very well known, have to be implemented very quickly to avoid quite 
unnecessary activity, either of a tax planning kind, or of a market distortion kind, 
and that freedom clearly has to be continued to be available to a Chancellor, but I 
am sure, politicians being what they are, that he will also bear in mind, perhaps 
particularly later in a Parliament, that Christmas is not a time at which he will 
wish to be seen to be too mean! That, therefore, is a substantial issue about the 
timing of individual tax decisions arising from a pre-Christmas Budget. 
Thirdly, there is also a substantial issue surrounding indexation. I remind you 
that at the moment the provisions are that those benefits which are geared to the 
RPI are geared to the September RPI whereas the tax system is geared to the 
December RPI. We clearly have to look at that and determine how, in future, we 
are going to link the tax system to the indexation rules, because I think it is fairly 
clearly undesirable to have a Chancellor unable to announce in the Budget 
address specific figures for large parts of the tax system, because he will not at 
that stage know the relevant indexation numbers. So that is a particular issue that 
has to be addressed and we also have to work through, with employers, the 
practicalities of the changes in the PAYE system, which will mean that all the 
changes in the PAYE system come into effect before the tax year starts. There 
will necessarily be some expense, for employers, in moving from a system which 
is established and where their internal systems reflect the existing tax practice, to 
a new system, although, clearly in my mind, a new system which, in the long run, 
will be to the benefit of employers. It will reduce costs for employers to only 
have one set of changes to code, rather than two, and it will be to the benefit of 
taxpayers as well. 
So those are a number of the practical consequences for taxpayers, for 
employers, for the Revenue and for anyone interested in this field that flow from 
the decision to go to a unified Budget in December. Fiscal Studies 
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The White Paper was set out specifically in order to seek opinions — as I 
have already said, about the parliamentary process, but also on more general 
issues that are raised by the proposal to go to a December Budget. We are 
seeking to consult, and perhaps in conclusion I can just say a word about 
consultation and the extent to which we can ensure that the tax system is flexible 
and responds to, and is knowledgeable about, the representations of 
professionals in the field. 
So far I have discussed the budgetary implications, the linking of revenue and 
expenditure, and the practical consequences that flow from a December Budget. 
Apart from saying that there will be no reduction in the time available for 
consideration of the Finance Bill, I have deliberately not talked about this 
proposal as being a major extension of the consultative process, or the 
consultative principal. It clearly is not that. That is not the prime motivation of 
this change. That is not to invalidate the arguments of those who are seeking to 
push more consultation upon us, but simply to suggest that this White Paper is 
addressed at a different issue. 
As far as the wider consultative issue is concerned, I would say that one of 
the things that has actually struck me in the six months I have been doing my 
present job is the extent to which every time we consider any serious change in 
the tax system, it is taken now as an assumption — not simply a consideration, 
but an assumption — that virtually any substantial change in the tax system is 
something that would be better implemented after a period of consultation. 
For example, on the proposals for the change of taxation of Schedule D, 
which are fairly major substantial changes in the operation of the tax system, we 
issued a consultative document. We are currently considering the results of that 
process. Where there are major changes, I am personally strongly of the view 
that the tax system is not best helped by Chancellors appearing at the dispatch-
box at the House of Commons at half past three one Tuesday afternoon and 
producing a succession of rabbits out of hats! Where we are talking about major 
structural reforms of tax, time for consideration, time for taking account of the 
views and the expertise of those who are actively involved in the field, is a 
benefit, not merely to taxpayers and the system, but also a benefit to the 
politicians, because it reduces the likelihood of egg on your face because you 
have announced something that has proved to be unworkable. 
So whilst this White Paper is not addressed at the issue of consultation, I 
would want to stress our continuing commitment both to consultative documents 
and to the process of draft clauses on particular technical issues, while, of 
course, emphasising what I always used to emphasise to those MPs who were in 
my area when I was a Whip, which is to say that the mere fact that I do not agree 
with you does not mean I have not listened to you, and to consult is not 
necessarily to say that whatever the consultation says will be reflected in the end 
result. We do, of course, answer to Parliament ultimately, and the Government 
making proposals to Parliament must reserve its position to go out to Budgetary Reform
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consultation, to hear the results of the consultation but then, ultimately, to make 
up its own mind and, of course, carry the can for its own decisions. That is what 
consultation means; it is not co-decision, it is consultation. Provided consultation 
is properly understood, it is something which, I am sure, has an important part to 
play in the evolution of a proper tax system. Not the least of the things on which 
we are currently consulting is this proposal for budgetary change. 
I would welcome your opinions please by 31 December in order to allow us 
proper time to consider them, and to reflect upon them, and, if they are cogent, to 
act upon them. I am quite certain — I am personally totally signed up to the 
proposition, and was, long before I joined the Government — that this type of 
change in our budgetary arrangements is something about which future 
generations will look back at our traditional arrangements and wonder how on 
earth they ever had a system that was so absurd as the one that we are about to 
abolish.  